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Abstract
For any transferable utility game in coalitional form with nonempty core, we show that
that the number of blocks required to switch from an imputation out of the core to an
imputation in the core is less than or equal to n(n− 1)/2, where n is the cardinality of the
player set. This number considerably improves the upper bounds found so far by Kóczy [8]
and Yang [17]. Our result relies on an altered version of the procedure proposed by Sengupta
and Sengupta [13]. The use of the Davis-Maschler reduced-games is also pointed out.
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1 Introduction
The core (Gillies [5]) is the solution concept for transferable utility games in coalitional form
(henceforth, simply called a TU-game) that collects the imputations which cannot be blocked
by any coalition of players. As such, it satisfies the internal stability property. Nevertheless,
the core is often criticized on two aspects. Firstly, it does not account for every imputation it
excludes, since it does not always satisfies the external stability property. Secondly, Harsanyi [6]
and Chwe [3] consider that this solution concept is too myopic because it neglects the effect of
indirect dominance relations.
Harsanyi [6] introduces two new indirect dominance relations in order to cope with these lacks.
In the first one, there exists a direct domination between any two consecutive imputations in the
chain of blocks. Even though Harsanyi originally applies this indirect dominance relation to study
the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets (von Neumann and Morgenstern [16]), Sengupta and
Sengupta [13] employ it to show that the core is indirectly externally stable: starting from any
imputation that stands outside the core, there always exists a chain of blocks which terminates
in the core. In other words, the core can be considered as a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set
of the indirect dominance relation. As such, the above-mentioned chain of blocks is finite. This
result has initiated the literature on the accessibility of the core. The central question that has
appeared is to determine a upper bound on the number of elements of the chain of blocks needed
to access the core.
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Several recent articles try to answer this question and this article improves on the existing
answers. Sengupta and Sengupta [13] introduce a procedure which ensures that the current
allocation is an imputation and that the core is reached after a bounded number of blocks.
However, the upper bound is not studied. Kóczy [8] provides the first description of an upper
bound, but it is overwhelmingly difficult to compute it and relies on the game under consideration.
Kóczy [8] is also aware that his bound should be lowered. This is precisely what Yang [17] achieves
by mean a more restrictive dominance relation, which never makes the past blocking coalitions
worse off. Yang’s construction is very instructive but his new upper bound is also sensitive to
the game under consideration since it is equal to the number of active coalitions in the game, i.e.
those coalitions different from the grand coalition for which the worth is greater than the sum of
the stand-alone worths of its members. Even if this number can be explicitly computed, it can
be exponentially large compared to the number of players.
In this article, we show that the core of any TU-game with n players can be accessed with
at most n(n− 1)/2 blocks.1 This result gathers many of the advantages of the above-mentioned
literature while it does not bear any of its main drawbacks. Firstly, it improves dramatically the
bound found by Kóczy [8], proving that the procedure which leads to the core is polynomial in the
number of player and not exponential as it was suspected until now. Secondly, our upper bound
is very easy to compute, while it is not the case in Kóczy [8]. Thirdly, our bound relies solely
on the number of players in the game, but not on the structure of the coalitional function, while
the bounds in Kóczy [8] and Yang [17] vary across TU-games with a same number of players.
For instance, the bound found by Yang [17] raises from 0 for a game with no active coalition to
2n − (n+ 2) for a game with the maximal number of active coalitions.
The procedure which is used to prove our result is similar to the one introduced by Sengupta
and Sengupta [13]. In particular, both procedures share the idea of using a core element as a
reference point. Nevertheless, we introduce two major differences. The first difference is related
to the choice, at each step of the procedure, of the coalition with respect to which the block
is constructed. While Sengupta and Sengupta [13] choose a coalition whose excess is maximal
with respect to the current imputation, we select a coalition among the smallest coalitions with
positive excess. The second difference is related to the way the excess of this chosen coalition
is redistributed at each step. While Sengupta and Sengupta [13] split this excess equally among
the players of the chosen blocking coalition whose payoff is less than their core reference payoff,
we try to fill in the gap between their current payoff and their core reference payoff for as many
players of the chosen coalition as possible. The objective of these two changes is to give to as
many new players as possible their core reference payoff at each step of the procedure.
Another feature of our procedure is that at each step of the procedure, we make use of the
Davis-Maschler reduced-games with respect to the core reference point and to the current coalition
of players who do not get their core reference payoff. Such Davis-Maschler reduced-games describe
situations in which all the players agree that the left players get their core reference payoffs but
continue to cooperate with the remaining players, subject to the foregoing agreement. The Davis-
Maschler reduced-games are well known for being the basis of the so-called reduced-game property,
which states that if an allocation is prescribed by some solution concept in a TU-game, then the
restriction of this allocation to any coalition of players is also prescribed by the solution concept
in the reduced-game associated with these coalition and allocation.
The literature on the accessibility of the core belongs to a broader literature on the accessibility
1It is a pure coincidence that this bound is equal to the number of pairs of players in any n-person game.
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of cooperative solution concepts. Manea [9] considers a tatônnement procedure that converges
to the core. This procedure is very simple and easy to implement but suffers from two lacks:
sometimes it never reaches the core and at each step the current allocation is not necessary an
imputation. Stearns [15] and Justman [7] provide procedures that converge to the bargaining
set (Aumann and Maschler [1]) and the Kernel (Davis and Maschler [4]), and to the Nucleolus
(Schmeidler [12]), respectively. These procedures are similar in spirit to the procedures used in
Manea [9]. Another contribution to this literature relies on the second type of indirect dominance
relation proposed by Harsanyi [6]. This indirect dominance relation assumes that the members
of the current blocking coalition do not compare their current payoff to their payoff in the next
imputation of the chain, but to their payoff in the last imputation of the chain. This is the reason
why the behavior of these coalitions of players is said to incorporate farsightedness. Chwe [3]
uses this indirect dominance relation in the general context of social situations, and introduces
and studies three new solution concepts: the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable set,
the farsighted core and the largest consistent set. Béal, Durieu and Solal [2] examine these
solution concepts for the class of all TU-games. They characterize the von Neumann-Morgenstern
farsighted stable sets and it is implicit in their proof that the number of imputations required
to access any von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable set is at most three (Lemma 2 on
page 308). Since any von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable sets belongs to the largest
consistent set (Chwe [3], Proposition 3), the same bound is obtained for the accessibility of the
largest consistent set. Finally, the accessibility of the farsighted core is trivial since Béal, Durieu
and Solal [2] show that it is either empty or coincides with the set of all imputations.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the definitions that are necessary
to state the main theorem. Section 3 introduces the Davis-Maschler reduced-games and proves
two lemmas that will be used in the proof of the main theorem. Section 4 completes the proof of
the main theorem. In this section, we first describe the procedure that will be the corner stone of
the proof of the main theorem. Then we demonstrate numerous claims on which the proof of the
main theorem relies, and the proof of the theorem itself. Section 5 provides examples in which our
procedure is compared to the alternative approaches. Section 6 concludes with an open question.
2 Preliminaries and the result
Let ⊆ denote weak set inclusion and ⊂ denote proper set inclusion. We use the notation |S| to
denote the number of elements in a finite set S.
A TU-game is a pair (N, v) where N = {1, . . . , n} is a nonempty finite player set and v :
2N −→ R is a real-valued function such that v(∅) = 0. A nonempty subset S of N is called a
coalition and v(S) is interpreted as the worth of coalition S.
An allocation x ∈ Rn on N is an n-dimensional vector giving a payoff xi ∈ R to each player
i ∈ N . Given an allocation x ∈ Rn and a coalition S, xS will denote the projection of x on S and
x(S) will stand for
∑
i∈S xi. For two allocations x, y ∈ Rn, we write xS > yS if xi ≥ yi for each
i ∈ S but xS 6= yS.
An allocation x ∈ Rn is efficient if x(N) = v(N) and individually rational if xi ≥ v({i}) for
each i ∈ N . An individually rational and efficient allocation is referred to as an imputation and
the set of imputations of the TU-game (N, v) is denoted by I(N, v).
Let Γ be the set of all finite TU-games. A solution on Γ is a function F which assigns to each
(N, v) ∈ Γ a set of allocations F (N, v).
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Given an allocation x ∈ Rn, the excess e(x, S) of a coalition S is given by
e(x, S) = v(S)− x(S).
The core is the solution C on Γ that assigns to each TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ the set C(N, v) of
imputations for which the excess of each coalition is not positive, i.e.
C(N, v) = {x ∈ I(N, v) : e(x, S) ≤ 0,∀S ∈ 2N\{∅}}.
Denote by Γc the set of TU-games in Γ with a nonempty core.
Let x, y ∈ Rn be two efficient allocations. We say that x directly dominates y via coalition
S, which we denote by x >S y, if xS > yS and x(S) ≤ v(S). We say that x indirectly dominates
y if there exists a finite sequence of efficient allocations (x0, . . . , xm) and a finite collection of
coalitions (S0, . . . , Sm−1) such that x0 = x, xm = y and for each k = 0, . . . ,m− 1,
xk+1 >Sk x
k.
We call the sequence (x0, S0, x1, . . . , xm−1, Sm−1, xm) a dominance path, and m its length.
The main result of the article can be stated as follows.
Theorem 1 Let (N, v) ∈ Γc be a TU-game. Then for each imputation x ∈ I(N, v)\C(N, v),
there exists a core element c ∈ C(v) and a dominance path from x to c with length smaller than
or equal to n(n− 1)/2 and such that each allocation along the path is an imputation.
3 Reduced-games equivalences
This section establishes connections between the cores of Davis-Maschler reduced-games and of
the original game. These intermediary results will be used later on to prove the main theorem.
Let S ⊂ N be any coalition different from N and x ∈ Rn any efficient allocation. Davis and
Maschler [4] propose the reduced-game with respect to S and x, denoted by (S, vS,x) and defined
as
vS,x(T ) =

0 if T = ∅,
v(N)− x(N\S) if T = S,
maxR∈2N\S
(
v(T ∪R)− x(R)) otherwise.
In this article, the direct dominance relation >S and the excess function e(·) will be used in
the Davis-Maschler reduced-games as well without any risk of confusion.
A solution F on Γ satisfies the reduced-game property if for each (N, v) ∈ Γ, each coalition
S ⊂ N and each x ∈ F (N, v), it holds that xS ∈ F (S, vS,x). It is well-known that the core satisfies
the reduced-game property. In fact, the reduced-game property is one of the axioms used by Peleg
[11] in order to characterize the core.
In the remainder of the article, we will focus on the set Γc of TU-games with a nonempty
core. For TU-games in this class, we will construct Davis-Maschler reduced-games with respect
to core elements only. This section establishes two interesting properties of such reduced-games.
To begin with, we formulate some remarks. So let (N, v) ∈ Γc be any TU-game with a nonempty
core, S ⊂ N be any coalition and c ∈ C(N, v) be any core element of (N, v). Note that the
Davis-Maschler reduced-game (S, vS,c) can be reformulated by the following simpler expression:
vS,c(T ) = max
R∈2N\S
(
v(T ∪R)− c(R))
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for each T ∈ 2S. In fact, c ∈ C(N, v) implies e(c, R) ≤ 0 for each R ∈ 2N\S, which in turn leads to
vS,c(∅) = 0 by choosing R = ∅, and Claim 1 below proves that the above-mentioned reformulation
of (S, vS,c) implies vS,c(S) = c(S).
Claim 1 Let (N, v) ∈ Γc be any TU-game with a nonempty core, S ⊂ N be any coalition and
c ∈ C(N, v) be any core element of (N, v). Then maxR∈2N\S
(
v(S ∪R)− c(R)) = c(S).
Proof. On the one hand, maxR∈2N\S
(
v(S ∪ R)− c(R)) ≥ v(S ∪ (N\S))− c(N\S) = c(S). On
the other hand, maxR∈2N\S
(
v(S ∪R)− c(R)) ≤ maxR∈2N\S (c(S ∪R)− c(R)) = c(S). 
For simplicity, for each T ∈ 2S, we denote by T a coalition in 2N\S such that vS,c(T ) =
v(T ∪ T )− c(T ).
Lemma 1 Consider any (N, v) ∈ Γc, any coalition S ⊂ N and any c ∈ C(N, v). Pick any
allocation x ∈ Rn such that xN\S = cN\S. Then, x ∈ C(N, v) if and only if xS ∈ C(S, vS,c).
Proof. Firstly, suppose that x ∈ C(N, v). Choose any coalition T ∈ 2S. By definition of vS,c, it
holds that vS,c(T ) = v(T ∪T )−c(T ). Since x ∈ C(N, v), we have v(T ∪T ) ≤ x(T ∪T ). Therefore,
vS,c(T ) ≤ x(T ∪ T )− c(T ) = xS(T ) since xT = cT . Regarding efficiency of xS in (S, vS,c), we have
xS(S) = x(N)− x(N\S) = c(N)− c(N\S) = c(S) = vS,c(S).
where the last equality follows from Claim 1.
Secondly, suppose that xS ∈ C(S, vS,c). Since xN\S = cN\S and xS(S) = vS,c(S) = c(S), we
get x(N) = c(N) = v(N), proving that x is an efficient allocation in (N, v). Next, choose any
coalition T ∈ 2N . The definition of vS,c and xS ∈ C(S, vS,c) imply that
v(T ) = v((T ∩ S) ∪ (T\S))
= v((T ∩ S) ∪ (T\S))− c(T\S) + c(T\S)
≤ vS,c(T ∩ S) + c(T\S)
≤ xS(T ∩ S) + c(T\S)
= x(T ),
which proves the result. 
Note that the proof of the first implication does not follow from the reduced-game property
since the imputation x that is proved to be in the core can be different from the core element c
from which the Davis-Maschler reduced-game is constructed.
Lemma 2 Consider any (N, v) ∈ Γc, any coalition S ⊂ N and any c ∈ C(N, v). Pick any two
efficient allocations x, y ∈ Rn such that xN\S = yN\S = cN\S and a coalition T ⊂ S. Then
x >T∪T y in (N, v) if and only if xS >T yS in (S, vS,c).
Proof. Firstly, assume that x >T∪T y in (N, v). Then xT∪T > yT∪T . In addition, T ∈ 2N\S
implies xT = yT . It follows that xT > yT . Next, x >T∪T y in (N, v) also means that x(T ∪ T ) ≤
v(T ∪T ). Therefore, by definition of x, we get vS,c(T ) = v(T ∪T )−c(T ) ≥ x(T ∪T )−c(T ) = x(T ).
We conclude that xS >T yS in (S, vS,c).
Secondly, assume that xS >T yS in (S, vS,c). Then xT > yT . Since xT = yT by assumption,
this implies that xT∪T > yT∪T . Moreover, xS >T yS in (S, VS,c) also means that x(T ) ≤ vS,c(T ) =
v(T ∪ T )− c(T ). Thus, v(T ∪ T ) ≥ x(T ) + c(T ) = x(T ∪ T ). Therefore x >T∪T y in (N, v). 
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4 Proof of Theorem 1
4.1 The procedure
We follow the approach developed Sengupta and Sengupta [13] but introduce two differences
between their construction and ours, which will be highlighted throughout this section.
Consider a TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γc. From now on, we fix an imputation x0 ∈ I(N, v) of
(N, v) and an arbitrary core element c ∈ C(N, v). We would like to construct a sequence of
imputations (x0, . . . , xm, . . . ), a sequence of coalitions (S0, . . . , Sm, . . . , ) and a sequence of TU-
games ((N0, vN0,c), . . . , (Nm, vNm,c), . . . ) with the following properties:
1. there is a m ≤ n(n− 1)/2 such that xm ∈ C(Nm, vNm,c);
2. for each k = 0, . . . ,m− 1, xk+1Nk >Sk xkNk in the TU-game (Nk, vNk,c);
3. for each k = 0, . . . ,m− 1, xkN\Nk = cN\Nk .
Therefore, we will be able to use Lemmas 1 and 2 to state that xmNm ∈ C(Nm, vNm,c) implies
xm ∈ C(N, v).
Before proceeding to the construction of the sequence of imputations (x0, . . . , xm, . . . ), we
give, for each k = 0, 1, . . . , the definitions of the TU-game (Nk, vNk,c) and coalition Sk assuming
that the imputation xk has already been defined. So let Nk be the set of players in Nk−1 who are
assigned in xk a different payoff than in c, i.e.
Nk = {i ∈ Nk−1 : xki 6= ci},
if k ≥ 1, and N0 = {i ∈ N : x0i 6= ci}. The TU-game (Nk, vNk,c) is the Davis-Maschler reduced-
game of (N, v) with respect to Nk and c, i.e. for each S ∈ 2Nk ,
vNk,c(S) = max
R∈2N\Nk
(
v(S ∪R)− c(R)).
One can remark that the TU-game “reduction” is a transitive operation in the sense that for each
k ≥ 1, the TU-game (Nk, vNk,c) is also the Davis-Maschler reduced-game of (Nk−1, vNk−1,c) with
respect to Nk and c. Next, in the Davis-Maschler reduced-game (Nk, vNk,c), we will denote Ek(x)
the set of coalitions with positive excess with respect to the efficient allocation x ∈ R|Nk|. We
choose coalition Sk among the set of smallest coalitions with positive excess with respect to xkNk
in (Nk, vNk,c), i.e.
Sk ∈ arg min
S∈Ek(xkNk )
|S|.
We will stop the construction of the sequence as soon as choosing such a coalition will become
impossible. Note that Sk exists and is nonempty if and only if xkNk 6∈ C(Nk, vNk,c). Here is a first
difference between our procedure and the one in Sengupta and Sengupta [13], since they choose
a coalition with the maximal excess. Kóczy [8] also chooses a coalition with the maximal excess.
In addition to coalition Sk, we define the coalition Tk of players in Sk who are assigned less in xk
than in c, i.e.
Tk = {i ∈ Sk : xki < ci}.
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Without any loss of generality, the players in Tk are labeled i1, . . . , i|Tk| in such a way that for
each q = 1, . . . , |Tk| − 1, it holds that
iq < iq+1 ⇐⇒ ciq − xkiq ≤ ciq+1 − xkiq+1 .
In other words, we order the players in Tk according to the difference between their payoffs in c
and in xk, from the smallest to the largest. Among the first collection of claims, Claims 2, 3, 4
and 6 are quite similar to the ones obtained by Sengupta and Sengupta [13]. We give the proofs
for completeness.
Claim 2 If xkNk 6∈ C(Nk, vNk,c) then Tk 6= ∅.
Proof. By contradiction, suppose xkNk 6∈ C(Nk, vNk,c) but Tk = ∅. Then the reduced-game
property implies that xk(Sk) ≥ c(Sk) ≥ vNk,c(Sk), which in turn implies that e(xkNk , Sk) ≤ 0, a
contradiction with the definition of Sk. 
Claim 3 If xkNk 6∈ C(Nk, vNk,c) and xk(Nk) = vNk,c(Nk), then Nk 6= Sk.
Proof. If xkNk 6∈ C(Nk, vNk,c), then Sk is nonempty. By contradiction, assume Nk = Sk.
By definition of Sk, we have xk(Sk) < vNk,c(Sk). Therefore we obtain xk(Nk) < vNk,c(Nk), a
contradiction with the assumption xk(Nk) = vNk,c(Nk). 
Note that it is implicit from the statement of almost all claims that the restriction of the
current allocation xk to Nk does not belong to C(Nk, vNk,c). In order to construct xk+1 from xk,
choose one of the players in Nk\Sk depicted in Claim 3, say player jk. In xk+1, we use the excess
e(xkNk , Sk) so as to rise x
k
i up to ci for as many players i in Tk as possible. This is the reason
why the players i ∈ Tk are ordered by the smallest amount they need in order to fill in the gap
between xki and ci. Any other player i ∈ Sk will keep his payoff xki . Lastly, each player i ∈ N\Sk
will receive ci except the chosen player jk who will get the remainder of vNk,c(Nk), which cannot
be less than cjk . Formally,
xk+1i =

ci if i = it ∈ Tk and
t∑
r=1
(
cir − xkir
) ≤ e(xkNk , Sk)
or i ∈ N\(Sk ∪ {jk}),
xki + e(x
k
Nk
, Sk)−
t−1∑
r=1
(
cir − xkir
)
if i = it ∈ Tk and
t−1∑
r=1
(
cir − xkir
) ≤ e(xkNk , Sk) < t∑
r=1
(
cir − xkir
)
,
xki if i = it ∈ Tk and
t−1∑
r=1
(
cir − xkir
)
> e(xkNk , Sk) or i ∈ Sk\Tk,
ci + vNk,c(Nk)− vNk,c(Sk)− c(Nk\Sk) if i = jk.
Here is a second difference with Sengupta and Sengupta [13]. In order to satisfy the coalition Sk,
these authors split equally the excess e(xkNk , Sk) among the players in Tk. By contrast, we order
the players in Tk so as to give as many players in Tk the difference between their current payoff
in xk and their targeted core payoff in c.
In the rest of this section, we show that for each k = 0, 1, . . . , xk+1Nk >Sk x
k
Nk
. the proof that
there is an integer m ≤ n(n− 1)/2 such that xmNm ∈ (Nm, vNm,c) is delegated to section 4.2.
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Claim 4 If xkNk 6∈ C(Nk, vNk,c), then for each i ∈ Nk\Tk, it holds that xk+1i ≥ ci.
Proof. By definition of Sk, xk+1i ≥ ci for each i ∈ Sk\Tk. By construction of xk+1, the players
in Nk\(Sk ∪ {jk}) get xk+1i = ci. So it remains to show that xk+1jk ≥ cjk . By construction of xk+1jk ,
it is sufficient to prove that vNk,c(Nk) − vNk,c(Sk) − c(Nk\Sk) ≥ 0. By Claim 1, we know that
c(Nk) = vNk,c(Nk). Therefore, since cNk ∈ C(Nk, vNk,c), we can write
vNk,c(Nk)− vNk,c(Sk)− c(Nk\Sk) = c(Nk)− vNk,c(Sk)− c(Nk\Sk)
= c(Sk)− vNk,c(Sk)
≥ 0,
as desired. 
Claim 5 For each k = 0, 1, . . . , it holds that xk ∈ I(N, v) and xk(Nk) = vNk,c(Nk).
Proof. For the first part of the claim, we proceed by induction on k = 0, 1, . . . .
Initial step: By assumption, the starting allocation x0 is an imputation of (N, v).
Induction hypothesis: let k ∈ N and assume that xq ∈ I(N, v) for each q = 0, 1, . . . , k.
Induction step: Consider the allocation xk+1. By the induction hypothesis, we know that
xk ∈ I(N, v). By construction of xk+1 and c ∈ C(N, v), we have xk+1i = ci ≥ v({i}) for each
i ∈ N\Nk. Claim 4 implies that xk+1i ≥ v({i}) for each i ∈ Nk\Tk. Moreover, for each i ∈ Tk we
have xk+1i ≥ xki by construction, which implies xk+1i ≥ v({i}) since xk ∈ I(N, v). Thus xk+1 is
individually rational.
Next, xk+1(N) can be decomposed as follows:
xk+1(N) = xk+1(Sk) + x
k+1(N\(Sk ∪ {jk})) + xk+1jk
= vNk,c(Sk) + c(N\(Sk ∪ {jk})) + cjk + vNk,c(Nk)− vNk,c(Sk)− c(Nk\Sk)
= c(N\Nk) + vNk,c(Nk).
Since vNk,c(Nk) = c(Nk) and c is an efficient allocation, we obtain xk+1(N) = c(N) = v(N), which
proves that xk+1 is also efficient.
For the second part of the claim, fix any k = 0, 1, . . . . Recall that vNk,c(Nk) = c(Nk) and
xki = ci for each i ∈ N\Nk. Thus, xk(Nk) = v(N) − xk(N\Nk) = c(N) − c(N\Nk) = c(Nk) =
vNk,c(Nk). 
Claim 6 If xkNk 6∈ C(Nk, vNk,c), then xk+1Nk >Sk xkNk .
Proof. By construction, we have xk+1(Sk) = vNk,c(Sk). Furthermore, Tk 6= ∅ by Claim 2, which
implies that there is i ∈ Tk such that xk+1i > xki . In addition, it is clear that the construction of
xk+1 ensures that xk+1i ≥ xki for each i ∈ Sk. Thus xk+1Nk >Sk xkNk . 
4.2 Analysis
In order to prove that our procedure ends up in the core after at most n(n − 1)/2 blocks, we
prove several extra claims. The two key variables are the size of Nk and the structure of Ek(xkNk)
as explained in the following. For any Davis-Maschler reduced-game (Nk, VNk,c), consider the
following three conditions on the set Ek(xkNk):
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1. there exists S ∈ Ek(xkNk) such that |S| < |Nk| − 1,
2. |S| = |Nk| − 1 for each S ∈ Ek(xkNk), and there exists a coalition S ∈ Ek(xkNk) such that
c(Sk) = vNk,c(Sk) or there exist a coalition S ∈ Ek(xkNk) and a player i ∈ S such that
0 < ci − xki ≤ e(xkNk , S),
3. |S| = |Nk| − 1 for each S ∈ Ek(xkNk), and there neither exist a coalition S ∈ Ek(xkNk) such
that c(Sk) = vNk,c(Sk) nor both a coalition S ∈ Ek(xkNk) and a player i ∈ S such that
0 < ci − xki ≤ e(xkNk , S).
Obviously, any set Ek(xkNk) satisfies one and only one of these conditions, and if |Nk| ≤ 2,
then Ek(xkNk) cannot satisfy condition 1. It is easy to check that once a player i ∈ Nk is allocated
a payoff xk+1i = ci, then his payoff will not be altered in the subsequent steps. As a consequence,
for each k = 0, 1, . . . , it holds that Nk+1 ⊆ Nk. Claim 7 below identifies the conditions on the
set Ek(xkNk) for which this inclusion is strict and Claim 8 explains that if Nk+1 = Nk, then the
number of coalitions of size |Nk| − 1 in Ek+1(xk+1Nk+1) must be less than in Ek(xkNk).
Claim 7 If either condition 1 or 2 is satisfied, then Nk+1 ⊂ Nk.
Proof. Firstly, suppose that condition 1 is satisfied. Then Sk is chosen such that |Sk| < |Nk|−1.
This means that there exists at least one player i ∈ Nk\(Sk ∪ {jk}). Any such player is allocated
a payoff xk+1i = ci. Since Nk+1 contains those players in Nk that are allocated a payoff different
from the one they receive in c, i 6∈ Nk+1. We conclude that Nk+1 ⊂ Nk.
Secondly, suppose that condition 2 is satisfied. If there exists a coalition S ∈ Ek(xkNk) such
that c(Sk) = vNk,c(Sk), then from xk+1(Sk) = vNk,c(Sk), |Sk| = |Nk| − 1 and Claim 5, we get
xk+1jk = cjk for the unique player jk in Nk\Sk. Thus jk 6∈ Nk+1 and we conclude that Nk+1 ⊂ Nk.
If there exist a coalition S ∈ Ek(xkNk) and a player i ∈ S such that 0 < ci − xki ≤ e(xkNk , S), then
consider player i1 ∈ Tk. We know that ci1 −xki1 ≤ e(xkNk , Sk). Therefore, xk+1i1 = ci1 . For the same
reason as above, i1 6∈ Nk+1 and we conclude once again that Nk+1 ⊂ Nk. 
Claim 8 If condition 3 is satisfied, then Nk+1 = Nk and {S ∈ Ek+1(xk+1Nk+1) : |S| = |Nk+1| − 1} ⊆
Ek(x
k
Nk
)\{Sk}.
Proof. Suppose condition 3 is satisfied. By construction of xk+1, we know that each player
i ∈ Sk\Tk will get xk+1i = xki > ci. By condition 3, we also know that the excess of Sk is too
small to increase the payoff of some player i ∈ Tk up to ci. Finally condition 3 tells us that
c(Sk) 6= vNk,c(Sk). Because cNk ∈ C(Nk, vNk,c), this means c(Sk) > vNk,c(Sk). Since xk+1Nk is
efficient in (Nk+1, vNk+1,c) by Claim 5 and xk+1(Sk) = vNk,c(Sk) by construction, we get x
k+1
jk
=
vNk,c(Nk)− vNk,c(Sk) > c(Nk)− c(Sk) = cjk for the unique player jk in Nk\Sk. As a consequence,
we obtain Nk+1 = Nk. Note that this implies that (Nk+1, vNk+1,c) = (Nk, vNk,c) and thus that
Ek+1(·) = Ek(·). Recall these equivalences throughout this proof.
In order to prove the second part of the claim, we start by the following observations. By
condition 3, player i1 ∈ Tk gets xk+1i1 = xki1 + e(xkNk , Sk) > xki1 , and for each player i ∈ Sk\{i1},
it holds that xk+1i = xki . Thus, i1 is the unique player in Sk who increases his payoff from xk
to xk+1. Claim 5 proves that xk+1Nk+1 is an efficient allocation in (Nk+1, vNk+1,c), so that we have
xk+1jk = x
k
jk
− e(xkNk , Sk) for the unique player jk in Nk\Sk. With these observations in mind, we
can consider successively all coalitions of size |Nk| − 1 in 2Nk .
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Firstly, consider the chosen coalition Sk or equivalently Nk\{jk}. By construction, we know
that xk+1(Sk) = vNk,c(Sk), which means that Sk 6∈ Ek+1(xk+1Nk+1).
Secondly, pick any player i ∈ Nk\{i1, jk} and consider the coalition Nk\{i}. Because Nk\{i}
contains both players i1 and jk, it follows that xk+1(Nk\{i}) = xk(Nk\{i}). Therefore, Nk\{i} ∈
Ek(x
k
Nk
) if and only if Nk\{i} ∈ Ek+1(xk+1Nk+1).
Thirdly, it remains to consider one last coalition of size |Nk|−1, namely coalition N\{i1}. By
condition 3, we know that xk+1i1 < ci1 . Together with the efficiency of allocations x
k+1
Nk+1
and cNk+1
in (Nk+1, vNk+1,c), this implies that
xk+1(Nk\{i1}) = xk+1(Nk+1\{i1}) > c(Nk+1\{i1}) ≥ vNk+1,c(Nk+1\{i1}).
where the last equality follows from the fact that cNk+1 ∈ C(Nk+1, vNk+1,c). Thus, Nk\{i1} 6∈
Ek+1(x
k+1
Nk+1
). We conclude that {S ∈ Ek+1(xk+1Nk+1) : |S| = |Nk+1| − 1} ⊆ Ek(xkNk)\{Sk}. 
Claim 10 below is essential for the proof of Theorem 1. It determines how many steps are
necessary to ensure a reduction of the population of a Davis-Maschler reduced-game. Its proof
relies on Claims 7 and 8, and on the maximal size that the set Ek(xkNk) can have if condition 3 is
satisfied. Claim 9 specifies how an upper bound on this size can be obtained.
Claim 9 Consider a TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γc, c an element of C(N, v) and an efficient allocation
x ∈ Rn. For each i ∈ N such that xi ≤ ci, we have e(x,N\{i}) ≤ 0.
Proof. The inequality
v(N\{i}) ≤ c(N\{i}) = c(N)− ci = x(N)− ci ≤ x(N)− xi = x(N\{i})
proves the statement. 
Claim 10 For any k ∈ N, at least one of the following cases holds:
• there exists q ∈ {1, . . . , |Nk| − 1} such that xk+qNk+q ∈ C(Nk+q, vNk+q ,c),
• |Nk+|Nk|−1| ≤ |Nk| − 1.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that none of the two cases holds. In particular,
|Nk+|Nk|−1| = |Nk| since for each q ∈ {1, . . . , |Nk| − 1}, we have Nk+q ⊆ Nk+q−1 by construction
of xk+q. We have seen that, when either condition 1 or 2 is satisfied, |Nk+1| ≤ |Nk| − 1, which
means that |Nk+|Nk|−1| ≤ |Nk| − 1. So it must be the case that condition 3 holds for any Nk+q,
q ∈ {0, . . . , |Nk| − 2}. In other words, for each q ∈ {0, . . . , |Nk| − 2}, the set Ek+q(xk+qNk+q) only
contains coalitions of size |Nk| − 1.
Now, let pkq denote the number of coalitions in Ek+q(x
k+q
Nk+q
), q ∈ {0 . . . , |Nk| − 1}. On the one
hand, there exists an agent i ∈ Nk such that xki < ci by Claim 2. From Claim 9, this implies that
pk0 ≤ |Nk|−1. On the other hand, Claim 8 proves that pkq > pkq+1 for each q ∈ {0, . . . , |Nk|−2}. As
a consequence, we get |Nk|−1 ≥ pk0 > pk1 > · · · > pk|Nk|−2 ≥ 1, which enforces that pkq = |Nk|−1−q
for each q ∈ {0, . . . , |Nk| − 2}. In particular, it holds that pk0 = |Nk| − 1, which in turn implies
that there exists a unique player in Nk, denoted by i for the rest of the proof, such that xki < ci.
Thus, for any agent j ∈ Nk\{i}, we have xkj ≥ cj, which yields xk+qj ≥ cj for each integer q ≥ 0
by construction.
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Next consider the set Ek+|Nk|−1(x
k+|Nk|−1
Nk+|Nk|−1
). From Claim 8, we know that Ek+|Nk|−1(x
k+|Nk|−1
Nk+|Nk|−1
)
does not contain any coalition of size |Nk|−1. So any nonempty coalition S ∈ Ek+|Nk|−1(xk+|Nk|−1Nk+|Nk|−1)
that we can pick has a size at most |Nk| − 2. There are two possibilities. Firstly, if the above-
mentioned player i 6∈ S, then for each player j ∈ S, xk+|Nk|−1j ≥ cj, and thus xk+|Nk|−1(S) ≥
c(S) ≥ v(S). Secondly, suppose that i ∈ S. Recall that condition 3 holds at each step k + q,
q ∈ {0, . . . , |Nk| − 2}. In particular, |Sk+|Nk|−2| = |Nk| − 1 and jk+|Nk|−2 is the unique player
in Nk\Sk+|Nk|−2. Recall also that the satisfaction of coalition Sk+|Nk|−2 implies the equality
x
k+|Nk|−1
i −xk+|Nk|−2i = xk+|Nk|−2jk+|Nk|−2−x
k+|Nk|−1
jk+|Nk|−2
since player i is the unique player such that xk+|Nk|−2i <
ci at step k + |Nk| − 2. From this equality, we obtain: xk+|Nk|−1(S) ≥ xk+|Nk|−2(S). In addition,
since the size of S is at most |Nk|−2, condition 3 yields S 6∈ Ek+|Nk|−2(xk+|Nk|−2Nk+|Nk|−2), so that we also
obtain xk+|Nk|−2(S) ≥ vNk+|Nk|−2,c(S). Therefore we get xk+|Nk|−1(S) ≥ vNk+|Nk|−2,c(S). We con-
clude that Ek+|Nk|−1(x
k+|Nk|−1
Nk+|Nk|−1
) = ∅, or equivalently that xk+|Nk|−1Nk+|Nk|−1 ∈ C(Nk+|Nk|−1, vNk+|Nk|−1,c), a
contradiction with the initial assumption. 
We now have the material required to prove Theorem 1.
Proof. [Theorem 1] Claim 6 proves that for each k = 0, 1, . . . such that xkNk 6∈ C(Nk, vNk,c), then
xk+1Nk >Sk x
k
Nk
. By Lemma 2, this implies that for each such k = 0, 1, . . . , we have xk+1 >Sk∪Sk x
k.
Thus, the sequence (x0, S0 ∪ S0, x1, S1 ∪ S1, . . . , xk, Sk ∪ Sk, xk+1) is a dominance path of length
k + 1 between x0 and xk+1.
By way of contradiction, assume that, for each integer m ≤ n(n−1)/2, we have xm 6∈ C(N, v).
For each k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, define the integer σ(k) = ∑kq=1(n − q). Hence σ(0) = 0 and σ(n) =
n(n−1)/2. We prove below by induction that, for each k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, it holds that |Nσ(k)| ≤ n−k.
Initial step: It is obviously that the inequality |Nσ(0)| = |N0| ≤ n follows from the definition
of N0.
Induction hypothesis: Pick any k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} and assume that |Nσ(q)| ≤ n− q for each
integer q ∈ {0, . . . , k}.
Induction step: Let us show that Nσ(k+1) ≤ n− k − 1. Recall that σ(k) < n(n− 1)/2 so that
xσ(k) 6∈ C(N, v) by assumption, which is equivalent to xσ(k)Nσ(k) 6∈ C(Nσ(k), vNσ(k),c) by Lemma 1.
Together with Claim 10, this implies that
|Nσ(k)+|Nσ(k)|−1| ≤ |Nσ(k)| − 1. (1)
By the induction hypothesis, we have |Nσ(k)| ≤ n− k, so that both sides of the inequality (1) can
be bounded as follows:
|Nσ(k)+n−k−1| ≤ |Nσ(k)+|Nσ(k)|−1| ≤ |Nσ(k)| − 1 ≤ n− k − 1.
Since σ(k) + n − k − 1 is precisely σ(k + 1), we conclude that |Nσ(k+1)| ≤ n − k − 1 as desired.
In particular, |Nσ(n)| ≤ n − n, which means that Nn(n−1)/2 is the empty set. In other words
xn(n−1)/2 = c, which contradicts the initial assumption that xn(n−1)/2 6∈ C(N, v). 
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5 A comparison with the alternative procedures
In this section, we compare our procedure with the other approaches by means of examples. A
first example shows that the tatônnement procedure adopted by Manea [9] may not reach the core
and that the allocations created along the procedure may not be imputations. The tatônnement
procedure of Manea [9] consists, at each step k, in choosing one of the coalitions with the greatest
excess with respect to the current allocation xk, say Sk, and to split equally this excess among the
players in Sk, while the loss is shared equally among the players in the complementary coalition
N\Sk, i.e.
xk+1i =
{
xki + e(x
k, Sk)/|Sk| if i ∈ Sk,
xki − e(xk, Sk)/|N\Sk| if i ∈ N\Sk.
So consider the three-player TU-game (N, v), with N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and with non-zero worths
given by the following table
S {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4} {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4} {1, 2, 3, 4}
v(S) 10 10 10 8 8 8 12
Imputation c = (9, 1, 1, 1) proves that the core of (N, v) is nonempty. Let imputation x0 =
(0, 0, 0, 12) 6∈ C(N, v) be our departure point. Note that the largest excess of 10 with respect
to x0 is borne by coalitions {1, 2} and {1, 3}. Without loss of generality, choose coalition {1, 2}.
Then the constructed allocation x1 = (5, 5,−5, 7) at the next step is not an imputation in (N, v).
Continuing in this fashion, it can be checked that the chain of blocks (x1, x2, . . . ) will never reach
the core since at any step of the tatônnement, coalition {1, 2} or {1, 3} or {2, 3, 4} will have
positive excess.
A second example illustrates that our bound considerably improves the best bound found so
far. Consider a n-player TU-game given with N = {1, . . . , n} and v({i}) = 0 for each i ∈ N ,
v(N) = n and v(S) = 1 otherwise. For any n ∈ N, the allocation c such that ci = 1 for each i ∈ N
belongs to the core. In addition, the game has the maximal number of active coalitions, that is
2n − (n + 2), and this number corresponds to the bound found by Yang [17]. For n sufficiently
large, the difference between this bound and our is considerable. For instance, if n = 20, then
Yang [17] obtains 1048554 while our bound shrinks to 190. According to Yang, the bound found
by Kóczy [8] is even greater. It can be argue that the bound of Yang is well-suited for TU-games
with a large number of players but few active coalitions. However, one can note that even TU-
games with a very simple structure can have a large number of active coalitions. For instance,
consider a unanimity TU-game (N, uS) on coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅}. The number of active coalitions
in (N, uS) is 2n−|S| − 1 if |S| ≥ 2 and 0 if |S| = 1. Therefore, the bound of Yang is greater than
our bound whenever
2 ≤ |S| ≤ n+ 1− log2(n+ 1)− log2(n− 2).
Again, if n = 20, the above condition is met for each unanimity TU-game (N, uS) such that
2 ≤ |S| ≤ 13. There are other classes of games with nonempty cores which contain a large
number of active coalitions, such as strictly superadditive TU-games and strictly convex TU-
games. Another similar class of TU-games is the class of queueing games studied by Maniquet
[10]. In such games, only coalitions of size two have a non-zero dividend, which implies that all
coalitions of size at least two are active. One last class of such games is the class of market games
introduced by Shapley [14]. For any TU-game in this class, any coalition containing at least one
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buyer and one seller has a worth of at least a unit, which is greater than the zero worth obtained
from summing the stand-alone worths of the members of the coalition.
Finally, it is difficult to make a comparison with the procedure in Sengupta and Sengupta
[13]. The two approaches are rather similar, but we believe that the two differences, on the choice
of the active coalition and on the redistribution of its excess among its members, are crucial in
establishing our result. The reader might have the same feeling after reading our proofs. Even
if we did not manage to measure the maximal number of blocks required by their procedure, we
believe that it is greater than n(n− 1)/2.
6 Conclusion
The new upper bound on the number of blocks required to access the core that we provide
in this article considerably improves the former existing bounds. We did not manage to prove
the same result with the procedure of Sengupta and Sengupta [13]. Therefore, we suspect that
the two differences between their procedure are the procedure used in this article are crucial in
establishing the result. Moreover, we expect that this bound can be lowered. In fact, we did not
succeed in finding examples where our bound is tight, which might suggests that the “worst-case”
scenarios considered in the proofs of Claims 8, 9 and 10 and Theorem 1 are very unlikely to occur
simultaneously. We therefore wonder whether our polynomial number of blocks can be sufficiently
reduced to become linear. This question is left for future works.
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